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value from probabilistic rewards
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Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Abstract Economic theories posit reward probability as one of the factors defining reward
value. Individuals learn the value of cues that predict probabilistic rewards from experienced
reward frequencies. Building on the notion that responses of dopamine neurons increase with
reward probability and expected value, we asked how dopamine neurons in monkeys acquire this
value signal that may represent an economic decision variable. We found in a Pavlovian learning
task that reward probability-dependent value signals arose from experienced reward frequencies.
We then assessed neuronal response acquisition during choices among probabilistic rewards. Here,
dopamine responses became sensitive to the value of both chosen and unchosen options. Both
experiments showed also the novelty responses of dopamine neurones that decreased as learning
advanced. These results show that dopamine neurons acquire predictive value signals from the
frequency of experienced rewards. This flexible and fast signal reflects a specific decision variable
and could update neuronal decision mechanisms.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.001
Introduction
Individuals frequently make predictions about the value of future rewards and update these predic-
tions by comparison with experienced outcomes. A fundamental determinant of reward value is
reward probability (Pascal, 2005). When an environmental cue predicts reward in a probabilistic
fashion, the brain needs to learn the value of such a cue from the frequency of experienced rewards.
Such learning enables individuals to compute the economic value of environmental cues and thus
allows forpa efficient decision making.
The phasic activity of dopamine neurons encodes reward prediction error (Schultz et al., 1997;
Bayer and Glimcher, 2005; Enomoto et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2012). These prediction error
responses increase monotonically with the expected value of reward, including reward probability
(Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005). Cues that predict reward with high probability evoke
larger responses than cues predicting the same reward with lower probability (Fiorillo et al., 2003).
Moreover, during an economic choice task, responses of dopamine neurons and striatal dopamine
concentration reflect the reward probability of the cue the animal has chosen (Morris et al., 2006;
Saddoris et al., 2015). In these studies, neuronal responses to reward predicting cues were exam-
ined only after the animals received substantial training with the same reward-predicting cues.
The responses of dopamine neurons have been also examined during learning (Mirenowicz and
Schultz, 1994; Hollerman and Schultz, 1998). These studies primarily focused on how dopamine
responses to rewards develop during learning of cue-reward association. This neuronal acquisition
happens gradually (Hollerman and Schultz, 1998), and is well-approximated by reinforcement learn-
ing (RL) models (Pan et al., 2005). Similarly, striatal dopamine concentration reflects values of proba-
bilistically delivered rewards during learning (Hamid et al., 2016). However, it remains unknown
how learning about probabilistic rewards shapes responses of dopamine neurons to reward predict-
ing cues, and how this neuronal learning participates in decision making.
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We addressed these questions by recording the activity of dopamine neurons in monkeys during
the learning of novel cues predicting specific reward probabilities. We studied dopamine responses
during both simple Pavlovian conditioning and during risky choices. In both tasks, dopamine
responses to cues showed two distinct response components: an early component reflecting novelty,
and a later component that developed during learning to encode the value of probabilistic rewards
acquired from experienced reward frequencies. Reinforcement learning models served to separate
these two components more formally. During choice, the acquired dopamine responses reflected
the value of the chosen option relative to the unchosen option.
Results
Pavlovian learning of probabilistic rewards
Pavlovian conditioning is the most basic mechanism by which an organism can learn to predict
rewards. This behavioural paradigm provides a straightforward platform for monitoring neuronal cor-
relates of learning. To investigate how responses of dopamine neurons develop during learning to
reflect the value of probabilistically delivered rewards, we monitored two monkeys during a Pavlov-
ian conditioning task (Figure 1A). Visual cues (fractal pictures, never seen before) predicted gambles
between a large (0.4 ml) and a small (0.1 ml) juice reward, delivered 2 s after cue onset. The proba-
bility of receiving the large reward was p=0.25, p=0.50, or p=0.75; the probability of small reward
was correspondingly 1 - p. In each learning block, three novel cues were differentially associated
with three different reward probabilities, but only one cue was presented to the animal on each trial.
This situation conforms to a learning set in which the animals learned to rapidly assign in each learn-
ing block one of the three possible probabilities to each cue (Harlow, 1949).
The animals gradually developed differential anticipatory lick responses, measured between cue
onset and reward delivery, over about 10 trials for each cue (Figure 1B, p<0.01 in both animals,
eLife digest Learning to choose the most fulfilling reward from a number of options requires
the ability to infer the value of each option from unpredictable and changing environments. Neurons
in the brain that produce a chemical called dopamine are critical for this learning process. They
broadcast a ’prediction error’ signal that alerts other areas of the brain to the difference between
the actual reward and the previously predicted reward. Previous studies have shown that when
dopamine neurons signal a prediction error, new learning about the value of an option takes place.
To understand exactly what happens during this learning process, Lak et al. recorded electrical
activity from dopamine neurons in the brains of two monkeys. Over a number of trials, the monkeys
were shown one of three different novel images, each of which was associated with a different
likelihood of receiving a large amount of a fruit juice reward.
The recordings showed that the dopamine response to cues was divided into early and late
components. At the start of learning, when the monkeys were unfamiliar with the likelihood that
each image would yield a large juice reward, the early part of the dopamine response was large. The
size of this part of the response decreased as the monkeys became more familiar with each image.
The later part of the dopamine response changed to reflect the rewards the monkeys had received
on previous trials. On trials where a reward was delivered, this part of the response grew larger, but
diminished if a reward was not given.
When the monkeys had to choose between rewards, the dopamine response was larger when the
monkey chose the higher valued option over the lesser valued one, and smaller when the opposite
choice was made, thus reflecting the animal’s choice. These choice-dependent responses were also
sensitive to the value of unchosen option, and therefore, reflected the difference between the value
of chosen and unchosen options.
Future studies are now required to find out how manipulating the activity of the dopamine
neurons influences the way animals learn and make decisions.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.002
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one-way ANOVA). This result suggests that the monkeys learned the value of novel sensory cues
that predicted rewards with different probabilities.
We recorded the responses of 38 and 32 dopamine neurons in monkeys A and B, respectively,
during this Pavlovian learning task. The neuronal responses to cues showed two components
(Figure 2A), analogous to previous studies (Nomoto et al., 2010; Stauffer et al., 2014;
Schultz, 2016). Specifically, an early activation at 0.1–0.2 s after cue onset most likely reflected the
previously observed novelty signals (Ljungberg et al., 1992; Horvitz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998;
Costa et al., 2014; Gunaydin et al., 2014). It decreased progressively during learning blocks
(Figure 2B, Figure 2—figure supplement 1A; and 55/70 neurons; p<0.05 power function fit to trial-
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Figure 1. Monkeys rapidly learn the value of cues that predict rewards with different probabilities. (A) Pavlovian
task. Left: example of novel visual cues (fractal images) presented to monkeys. In each trial, animals were
presented with a visual cue and received a large (0.4 ml) or small (0.1 ml) drop of juice reward 2s after cue onset.
Specific cues predicted the large reward with probabilities of p=0.25, p=0.5 and p=0.75, together with small
reward at 1–p. In each session of the experiment (lasting 90–120 trials), three novel cues were differentially
associated with the three tested reward probabilities. Over consecutive trials, cues with different reward
probabilities were presented to animals pseudorandomly. Trials were separated by inter-trial intervals of 2–5 s.
Animals had no specific behavioural requirements throughout this task. (B) Monkeys’ lick responses during
Pavlovian learning. The lick responses were measured from cue onset to onset of reward delivery.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.003
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Figure 2. Responses of dopamine neurons acquire predictive value from the frequency of rewards. (A) Peri-
stimulus time histograms (PSTHs) of a dopamine neuron in response to novel cues predicting rewards with
different probabilities. Pink (0.1–0.2 s after cue onset) and grey (0.2–0.6 s after cue onset) horizontal bars indicate
analysis windows used in B and C, respectively. (B) Decrease of neuronal population responses, measured at 0.1–
0.2 s after cue onset (pink inset), over consecutive learning trials. Error bars show standard error of mean (s.e.m.)
across neurons (n = 70, pooled from monkeys A and B). (C) Differentiation of neuronal population responses,
measured at 0.2–0.6 s after cue onset (grey inset), over consecutive learning trials. The following figure supplement
is available for Figure 2:
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.004
The following figure supplement is available for figure 2:
Figure supplement 1. Compound novelty-value responses of dopamine neurons to novel cues associated with
different probabilistic rewards.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.005
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by-trial responses), reflecting cue repetition better than number of consecutive trials (R2 = 0.86 vs.
R2 = 0.53, linear regression). This response component failed to differentiate between the cues pre-
dicting different reward probabilities (Figure 2B, p=0.61, one-way ANOVA).
In contrast to the initial novelty response, a subsequent response component occurred at 0.2–
0.6 s after cue onset and became differential during the learning of different reward probabilities
(Figure 2C, 26/70 neurons, one-way ANOVA on responses from sixth to last trial, p<0.05). These
responses became statistically distinct after experiencing each cue six times (Figure 2C, p<0.01,
one-way ANOVA on trial-by-trial neuronal population responses). Thus, throughout each short learn-
ing session with a new set of fractal images, a considerable fraction of dopamine neurons learned
the value of reward predicting cues from the frequency of experienced rewards. Analysis on the
whole duration of neuronal response (0.1–0.6 s after cue onset) showed that the compound novelty-
value responses decreased over consecutive learning trials and also reflected the learned value of
cues (Figure 2—figure supplement 1B). Taken together, these results demonstrate how dopamine
neurons gradually acquire probability-dependent value responses from the frequency of experienced
rewards, and how these responses differ from their novelty responses.
Examination of dopamine prediction error responses to reward delivery provided further evi-
dence for neuronal acquisition of reward probability. Neuronal responses to reward developed grad-
ually to reflect the values of the cues. Specifically, activating neuronal responses to large reward (0.4
ml) were larger after cues that predicted this outcome with lower probability, compared to cues pre-
dicting the same outcome with higher probability (Figure 3A top). Conversely, depressant neuronal
responses to small reward (0.1 ml) were more pronounced after cues predicting large reward with
higher probability (Figure 3A bottom). Thus, both the activating and depressant responses were
consistent with reward prediction error coding. The neuronal responses to both large and small
rewards differentiated gradually over consecutive trials, based on the predicted probability of get-
ting each of those rewards, and reached statistical significance after 9 and 16 trials, respectively
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Figure 3. Responses of dopamine neurons to reward delivery develop over trials to reflect the learned value of
probabilistic cues. (A) PSTHs of example dopamine neurons in response to delivery of large and small juice
rewards (top, bottom). Probabilities indicated in colour refer to the occurrence of the large reward in gambles
containing one large and one small reward (0.4 ml and 0.1 ml, respectively). (B) Neuronal population responses to
large and small juice rewards over consecutive learning trials. Responses were measured in analysis windows
indicated by corresponding grey horizontal bars in A (top: 0.15–0.5 s, bottom: 0.2–0.45 s after reward onset).
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.006
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(Figure 3B, p<0.02, one-way ANOVA on neuronal population responses). The development of
dopamine responses to rewards further suggests that early and late responses to cues convey dis-
tinct signals. If early responses to cues contained predictive values signals (i.e. reflecting an optimis-
tic value initialisation), such signals should have contributed to prediction error computations at
reward time. However, the pattern of neuronal reward prediction errors (Figure 3B) suggests that
these responses were computed in relation to late responses to cues, and reflected cue values initial-
ised around the average value of all cues. Accordingly, neuronal responses to rewards were
accounted for by the late component of neuronal responses to cues as well as the received reward
size, with no significant contribution from the early component of cue responses (p=0.0001, 0.43
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Figure 4. A reinforcementlearning model with a novelty term and an adaptive learning rate account for dopamine
responses during learning. (A) Schematic of RL models fitted on neuronal responses. In each trial, the model
updates the value of stimulus based on the experienced reward prediction error. Six variants of RL models were
tested (three different learning rates, each with or without novelty term). In brief, we optimized the free parameters
of each model so that it minimized the difference between dopamine responses to cues (measured 0.1–0.6 s after
the cue, thus including both novelty and value component) and model’s estimates of novelty + value. We then
examined the relation between value-driven neuronal responses and value estimates of the superior model and
also the relation between novelty-driven neuronal responses and novelty estimates of the superior model. For
details of model implementation and fitting procedure see Materials and methods. (B) Left: Value estimates of the
superior model (i.e. the model with a novelty term and adaptive learning rate) overlaid on neuronal population
responses measured 0.2–0.6s after the cue onset,(from Figure 2C). For details of parameter estimation and model
comparison see Supplementary file 1. Right: Regression of dopamine responses to cues (dopamine value
responses, i.e. 0.2–0.6 s after the cue onset) onto value estimates of the superior RL model. See Figure 4—figure
supplement 1 for regression of dopamine novelty signals onto novelty-driven model’s estimates.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.007
The following figure supplement is available for figure 4:
Figure supplement 1. A reinforcement learning model with a novelty term and an adaptive learning rate account
for dopamine responses during learning.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.008
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and 0.021 for reward size, early and late cue responses, respectively; multiple linear regression).
Thus, the development of the prediction error responses at the time of reward reflect the acquisition
of probability-dependent value responses to cues; dopamine neurons learn the value of novel cues
and use these learned values to compute prediction errors at the time of the outcome.
Dopamine responses to rewards and reward-predicting cues are described well by prediction
errors derived from standard reinforcement learning (RL) models. These models calculate trial-by-
trial prediction errors and use these values, weighted by a learning rate parameter, to update asso-
ciative strengths. While it is straightforward to see that in the RL framework positive and negative
reward prediction errors, encountered upon receiving large and small rewards, can lead to reward
probability-dependent cue responses, it is not clear what form of RL model can best account for the
development of value and novelty driven dopamine responses during learning. We therefore investi-
gated different variants of RL models to discover which RL variant can best capture the observed
development of dopamine responses.
We devised models with three different types of learning rates: (1) a learning rate which was fixed
over trials resembling the original Rescorla-Wagner model (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972), (2) a learn-
ing rate that decayed over trials thus representing the idea that updating should occur faster in early
trials, and (3) a learning rate that was adaptively adjusted on every trial based on past prediction
errors, thus capturing the idea that learning is slower when prediction errors are negligible
(Pearce and Hall, 1980; Pearce et al., 1981; Le Pelley, 2004). For each of the three learning rate-
type models, we fit the data with and without the presence of a term for the novelty which decayed
over trials (Figure 4A, see Materials and methods) (Kakade and Dayan, 2002). Thus, in total we
explored six model variants, and fit the models to the dopamine responses using the rewards actu-
ally delivered during the experiments (Materials and methods).
The model that included an adaptive learning rate and novelty term outperformed all other
model variants in accounting for dopamine responses (Figure 4B left and Figure 4—figure supple-
ment 1A, see Supplementary file 1 for details of parameter estimation and model comparisons).
Consistent with this, regression of second component dopamine responses to cues (0.2–0.6 s after
the cue onset) onto value estimates of the superior model was highly significant (Figure 4B, right, R2
= 0.93, p=0.00003). Moreover, regression of dopamine novelty responses to model-driven novelty
estimates was statistically significant (Figure 4—figure supplement 1B, R2 = 0.63, p=0.001). In this
simulation, the estimated learning rate decayed over trials, while fluctuating based on past predic-
tion errors (Figure 4A and Figure 4—figure supplement 1C, Supplementary file 1). The model fit-
tings suggested that the development of early and late responses to cues follows different temporal
dynamics. In a model variant that is rearranged to include the novelty decay term as an error-driven
learning process (simulating optimistic value initialisation), the recovered learning constant for the
first component of cue responses was significantly larger than the recovered learning constant for
the late response component (Figure 4—figure supplement 1D, p<0.0001, Mann-Whitney U test,
see Materials and methods). This observation suggests that early and late components of dopamine
responses follow distinct temporal dynamics. Together, these results suggest that, during learning
about probabilistic rewards, the trial-by-trial dopamine responses to cues adjust according to how
much learning has advanced. Neuronal responses to cues rapidly develop early during learning and
value updating becomes slower as learning progresses and prediction errors become smaller.
Learning the value of probabilistic rewards during choice
Our findings so far demonstrate that dopamine neurons acquire the value of probabilistic rewards
during a Pavlovian learning paradigm. We next investigated the behavioural and neuronal signatures
of learning about probabilistic rewards during a decision task. As before, we used new fractal stimuli
for each learning episode, which also prevented a carry-over of learned pictures from the Pavlovian
to the choice task.
The animals made saccade-guided binary choices between two cues (Figure 5A). The animals
had extensive prior experience with one of the cues (familiar cue) that predicted a 50% chance of
receiving a large reward (0.4 ml) and 50% chance of receiving a small reward (0.1 ml). In each block
(typically 50 trials) the familiar cue was always offered as one choice alternative. The other cue was
novel, and its reward probability was unknown to the animal. Similar to the Pavlovian task, the novel
cues were associated with reward probabilities of 0.25, 0.50 or 0.75 of receiving the large (0.4 ml)
reward and 0.1 ml otherwise. This situation resembled a learning set (Harlow, 1949) in which the
Lak et al. eLife 2016;5:e18044. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044 6 of 19
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animals rapidly learned to assign one of three possible values to the novel cue. In this task monkeys
had to choose the novel cue in order to learn its reward probability. At the onset of each learning
block, both monkeys consistently selected the novel cue in the first few trials (Figure 5B, p<0.01 in
both animals, Mann-Whitney U test on choice probabilities in trials 1–4 versus later trials). This
exploratory behaviour was accompanied by shorter saccadic response times (measured between cue
onset and saccadic acquisition of the chosen option), compared to the response times observed dur-
ing later trials when the highest probability option was usually chosen (Figure 5C, p<0.01 in both
animals, Mann-Whitney U test on trials 1–4 versus later trials). After five trials, both animals chose
the higher option 75% of the time (p<0.001; one-way ANOVA on choice probabilities). These results
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Figure 5. Monkeys rapidly learn to make meaningful choices among probabilistic reward predicting cues. (A)
Choice task. In each trial, after successful central fixation for 0.5 s, the animal was offered a choice between two
cues, the familiar cue and the novel cue. The animal indicated its choice by a saccade towards one of the cues.
The animal was allowed to saccade as soon as it wanted. The animal had to keep its gaze on the chosen cue for
0.5 s to confirm its choice. Reward was delivered 1.5 s after the choice confirmation. The animals had extensive
prior experience with one of the cues (familiar cue predicting 50% chance of getting 0.4 ml and 50% chance of
receiving 0.1 ml). The alternative cue was a novel cue with the reward probability unknown to the animal. The
novel cues were associated with reward probabilities of 0.25, 0.50 or 0.75 of receiving the large (0.4 ml) reward and
0.1 ml otherwise. After a block (of typically 50 trials) the novel cue was replaced with another novel cue. Trials were
separated with inter-trial interval of 2–5 s. Failure to maintain the central fixation or early breaking of fixation on
the chosen option resulted in 6 s time-out. (B) Monkeys’ choice behaviour. At the onset of each learning session,
both animals chose the novel cue over the familiar cue for 4–5 trials. Afterwards, animals preferentially chose the
cue that predicted reward with higher probability. (C) Saccadic choice response times. Both monkeys showed
significantly faster reaction times (defined as the interval between the cue onset and the time the animal’s saccade
acquired the chosen option) in the first 4–5 trials of each learning block. Error bars are s.e.m across behavioural
sessions.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.009
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suggest that the animals rapidly learned the value of novel reward predicting cues in the choice task
and used these learned values to make efficient economic choices.
We recorded dopamine activity during the choice task (57 and 42 neurons in monkey A and B). In
order to examine neuronal signatures of probability-dependent value learning, we first focused on
trials in which animal choose the novel cues. Neuronal responses immediately after the cue onset
(0.1–0.2 s after the cue onset) decreased over consecutive trials, reflecting the stimulus novelty (76/
99 neurons, power function fit on trial-by-trial responses, p<0.05), but never differentiated to reflect
the learned value of cues (Figure 6A, p>0.1 in both animals, one-way ANOVA on population
responses). In contrast, the later component of the neuronal response (0.4 to 0.65 s after the cue
onset) developed differential responses that reflected the learned value of cues (Figure 6B, p<0.01
from fifth trial onwards, one-way ANOVA on neuronal population responses). Neuronal activity
between these two windows of analysis reflected a smooth transition from encoding stimulus novelty
to encoding the learned value signals (Figure 6—figure supplement 1). These results indicate that
during economic choices, dopamine responses contain two distinct components; the first compo-
nent of the neuronal responses mainly reflects the stimulus novelty, whereas the second component
of neuronal activity differentiates during learning to encode the learned value of cues.
We then explored signatures of value learning in neuronal responses to rewards. We analysed the
dopamine responses to rewards, focusing again on trials in which animals chose the novel cue.
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Figure 6. Dopamine responses to cues differentiate as monkeys learn the value of novel cues in the choice task.
(A) Neuronal population responses to cues over consecutive trials of the choice task, measured during 0.1–0.2 s
after the cue onset (Dopamine novelty responses, see inset). Only trials in which animal chose the novel cue were
shown in all panels of this figure. (B) Neuronal population responses to cues over consecutive trials of the choice
task, measured during 0.4–0.65 s after the cue onset (Dopamine value responses, see inset). See Figure 6—figure
supplement 1 for more detailed analysis of time course of the neuronal activity. (C) Population dopamine
responses to the large reward over trials in which the novel cue was chosen and large reward was delivered. (D)
Population dopamine responses to the reward delivery in trials in which the novel cue was chosen. Each bar
demonstrates the mean neuronal response averaged across later (30th to last trial) of each session. Bars on the left
represent neuronal activity in response the large reward (0.4 ml). Bars on the right represent neuronal activity in
response to the small reward (0.1 ml). Inset illustrates PSTHs of an example neuron in response to small and large
rewards. Horizontal bars in the inset indicate the temporal window used for computing bar plots (large rewards:
0.1–0.55 s after the reward onset, small rewards: 0.2–0.45 s after the reward onset). Error bars represent s.e.m
across neurons (n = 99, pooled from monkeys A and B).
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.010
The following figure supplement is available for figure 6:
Figure supplement 1. Neuronal responses to cue in the choice task.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.011
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Following the initial trials of each learning block, neuronal responses to reward began to reflect the
probability predicted by the chosen cue (Figure 6C, p<0.01 after 36 choice trials; one-way ANOVA
on responses to the large reward). In accordance with reward prediction error coding, the responses
to 0.4 ml juice were significantly larger when the chosen cue predicted this outcome with lower com-
pared to higher probability (Figure 6D left, p<0.001 in both animals, one-way ANOVA on neuronal
responses averaged from 30th to the last trial of each block). Similarly, the negative prediction error
responses to the small (0.1 ml) rewards were more pronounced (i.e. stronger depression of activity)
when the chosen cue predicted this outcome with lower probability (Figure 6D right, p=0.02, one-
way ANOVA on neuronal responses averaged from 30th to last trial of the block). Together, these
results indicate that during a learning task that included economic choice, dopamine neurons learn
the value of novel cues from the probabilistic outcomes associated with those cues and compute
reward prediction errors by comparing these learned values with the actual trial outcome.
Choice-dependent dopamine responses
To investigate whether dopamine responses depended on the animals’ choice, we divided the trials
according to the choice that the animals made (i.e. lower probability chosen or higher probability
chosen), and examined the trial-by-trial neuronal responses to cue presentations. The magnitude of
the neuronal response depended on the choice (Figure 7A). Larger neuronal responses occurred
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Figure 7. During learning dopamine neurons acquire choice-sensitive responses which emerge prior to response
initiation. (A) Population dopamine PSTHs to cues in the choice task. Grey horizontal bar indicates the temporal
window used for statistical analysis. In all plots, all trials of learning blocks are included. Note that the results
would be similar after excluding initial trials of each learning session. (B) Population dopamine responses to cues
(0.4–0.65 s after the cue onset) over consecutive choice trials. Trials are separated based on animal’s choice. (C)
Population dopamine PSTHs aligned to the saccade initiation (i.e. the time on which animal terminated the central
fixation to make a saccade towards one of the cues). Dopamine choice-sensitive responses appeared ~130 ms
prior to saccade initiation. (D) Averaged neuronal population responses to cues in trials in which animals chose the
familiar cue. Despite the fact that animal had extensive experience with the familiar cue (and hence accurate
estimate of its value), neuronal responses showed dependency on the value of the unchosen cue. See Figure 7—
figure supplement 1 for the time course of this effect over consecutive trials of learning.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.012
The following figure supplement is available for figure 7:
Figure supplement 1. Population dopamine responses to cues over trials in which animals chose the familiar cue
over the novel cues.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.013
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when the animal chose the higher probability (more valuable) option, compared to the lower proba-
bility (less valuable) option (Figure 7A, p<0.02, Mann-Whitney U test on population responses dur-
ing 0.25–0.65 s after cue onset in both animals and p<0.02 in 11 out of 99 single cells, Mann-
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Figure 8. Dopamine neurons encode relative chosen values. (A) Left: Animals choices were simulated using
standard reinforcement learning (RL) models (see Figure 8—figure supplements 1 and 2 and Materials and
methods). Dotted lines show the performance of the model in predicting monkeys’ choices. Solid lines show
monkeys’ choice behaviour (identical to Figure 5B). The parameters of the RL model were separately optimized
for each behavioural session (Supplementary file 2). Right: The RL model’s session-by-session probability of
choosing the novel cue, estimated using model’s optimized parameters, versus monkeys’ session-by-session
probability of choosing the novel cue. (B) Upper panel: Regression of neuronal population responses to cues onto
trial-by-trial chosen values estimated from the RL model fitted on monkeys’ choice data. Lower panel: Regression
of neuronal population responses to cues onto trial-by-trial unchosen values estimated from the RL model fitted
on the choice data. (C) Regression of neuronal population responses to cues onto trial-by-trial relative chosen
values (i.e. chosen value – unchosen value) estimated from the RL model fitted on the choice data. Importantly,
the chosen and unchosen value variables were not, on average, strongly correlated (r =  0.039, Pearson’s
correlation), and we excluded from this analysis sessions in which the absolute value of the correlation coefficient
between the chosen and unchosen variables was larger than 0.25. In B and C, the neuronal responses were
measured 0.4–0.65 s after cue onset (i.e. dopamine value signals) and are regressed against value estimates of the
superior model. In explaining the neuronal responses, relative chosen value outperformed other variables in all six
models tested. See Figure 8—figure supplement 2B for regression of responses measured 0.1–0.2 s after cue
onset (i.e dopamine novelty responses) onto model-driven novelty estimates. Regression of whole neuronal
responses (0.1–0.65 s after the cue onset) against value estimates of the RL model further confirmed relative
chosen value as the best explanatory variables (R2 = 0.57, 0.61 and 0.83 for unchosen, chosen and relative chosen
values). In all plots, all trials of learning blocks are included (regression results are similar after excluding initial (i.e.
5) trials of each session).
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.014
The following figure supplements are available for figure 8:
Figure supplement 1. Schematic of the RL model used for simulating monkeys’ choice behaviour.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.015
Figure supplement 2. Estimated learning rates of the RL model and regression of dopamine novelty responses to
model-driven novelty estimates.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044.016
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Whitney U test). The early response component (0.1–0.2 s after cue onset) did not reflect animals’
choice (p>0.1 in both animals, Mann-Whitney U test). The choice-sensitivity of neuronal responses
developed rapidly during learning; they reached statistical significance after five choice trials
(Figure 7B, p<0.01 from fifth trial onwards, one-way ANOVA). Within a given trial, choice predictive
activity arose as early as 130 ms prior to saccade onset (Figure 7C, analysis window starting 0.2 s
before the choice onset, p<0.01 from 130 ms before saccade onset, Mann-Whitney U test). These
results demonstrate that during learning dopamine responses rapidly develop choice sensitivity and
reflect the value of the option chosen by the animal (i.e. chosen value). Furthermore, these neurons
began encoding this decision variable even before the overt choice (i.e. onset of saccade) occurred.
We next investigated whether neuronal responses during choice could also reflect the value of
unchosen option. We inspected trials in which the animals chose the familiar cue, and divided those
trials according to the reward probability of the novel cue. Despite the fact that the animals had
extensive experience with the familiar cues (and hence accurate estimates of their value), the neuro-
nal responses during choices of the familiar cue were significantly larger when the alternative option
predicted low compared to high probability of the same large reward (Figure 7D, p=0.01, one-way
ANOVA, see Figure 7—figure supplement 1 for the time course of the effect). Together, these
results suggest that during choices among probabilistic rewards, dopamine responses are sensitive
to the value of both chosen and unchosen options.
We used RL models, similar to those described in the Pavlovian experiment but modified to
account for choice, to explore the observed neuronal coding in a trial-by-trial fashion (Figure 8—fig-
ure supplement 1, see Materials and methods). The model with adaptive learning rate and novelty
term outperformed all other models in accounting for animals’ choices (see Supplementary file 2
for parameter estimation and model comparison). This model accounted well for animals’ trial-by-
trial choices throughout learning blocks (Figure 8A, left) as well as their session-by-session preferen-
ces (Figure 8A, right, r = 0.86, p<0.0001). Similar to the Pavlovian experiments, the estimated learn-
ing rate exhibited a decay over trials while maintaining sensitivity to past prediction errors
(Figure 8—figure supplement 2A). In all tested models, the estimated learning of the novel cue
was larger than the estimated learning rate of the familiar cue, indicating that during learning ani-
mals updated the value of novel cue more than the value of familiar cue (Supplementary file 2). Lin-
ear regression of the neuronal responses (measured 0.4–0.65 s after the cue onset) onto model’s
value estimates revealed a positive relationship to chosen values and an negative relationship to
unchosen value (Figure 8B, chosen value: R2 = 0.65, p=0.005, unchosen value: R2 = 0.84, p=0.0001,
single linear regression). However, a relative chosen value variable, defined as chosen value –
unchosen value, fit the data far better, compared to the chosen or unchosen value variables
(Figure 8C, R2 = 0.91, p=0.00005, single linear regression, p<0.02 in 15 out of 99 single cells), con-
firming earlier results shown in Figure 7. Similar to the Pavlovian experiment, regression of dopa-
mine novelty responses (0.1–0.2 s after the cue) onto model’s novelty estimates was significant (R2 =
0.61, p=0.001, Figure 8—figure supplement 2B). Together, these results suggest that when the ani-
mals learn to choose among probabilistic rewards, dopamine neurons took the value of both chosen
and unchosen options into account and thus reflected relative chosen value.
Discussion
Building on previous findings that the prediction error responses of dopamine neurons increase
monotonically with reward probability and expected value (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al.,
2005), this study shows how these probability dependent value responses evolve through learning.
Dopamine responses showed two distinct response components. Responses immediately after the
cues decreased as learning advanced, reflecting novelty. The second response component devel-
oped during learning to encode the value of probabilistic rewards acquired from experienced
reward frequencies. Correspondingly, the prediction error responses at reward time changed over
the course of learning to gradually reflect the learned reward values. Results from previous studies
on fully established tasks suggest that the acquired dopamine responses to probabilistic rewards do
not code reward probability on its own but rather increase monotonically with the statistical
expected value (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Tobler et al., 2005). The present learning data are fully com-
patible with those results. During choices, the acquired dopamine value signals coded the value of
the chosen option relative to the unchosen option. These results are consistent with previous
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findings that showed chosen value coding in dopamine neurons (Morris et al., 2006). However, we
provide new evidence in favour of a more nuanced, relative chosen value coding scheme whereby
dopamine responses also reflect the value of un-chosen option. Together, our data suggest that
dopamine neurons extract predictive reward value from the experienced reward frequency and code
this information as relative chosen value.
Throughout learning, dopamine responses to cues developed to reflect the value of upcoming
rewards, indicating that these neurons extract predictive value signals from experienced reward fre-
quencies. In the learning experiment that involved choices, the neuronal responses rapidly differenti-
ated to reflect animal’s choice. These differential responses, despite appearing more than 100 ms
prior to overt behaviour, reflect prediction errors in relation to an already computed choice, and
thus might not directly participate in current choice computation. Our modelling results provided
further insights into the dynamics of neuronal learning process. First, the development of neuronal
responses over trials as well as animals’ choices were best explained by models that adaptively
adjusted their learning rate based on past prediction errors, resembling previous studies in human
subjects (Nassar et al., 2010; Diederen and Schultz, 2015). Second, value-dependent dopamine
responses were still updated even after the dopamine novelty responses stabilized, suggesting two
distinct time courses for these two components of neuronal activity. Interestingly, in both Pavlovian
and choice tasks, behavioural preferences as well as neuronal responses to cues reflected reward
probability earlier during learning than the neuronal reward responses. This temporal difference
might suggest an origin of behavioural preferences and acquired dopamine cue responses in other
brain structures, rather than relying primarily on dopamine reward prediction error signals.
We observed that early during learning, dopamine novelty responses were large and they slowly
decreased over consecutive trials, due to a decrease in stimulus novelty as suggested previously
(Horvitz et al., 1997; Schultz, 1998; Kakade and Dayan, 2002; Gunaydin et al., 2014). In both
tasks, the novelty signals were mainly present in initial component of neuronal responses to cues.
We used RL models to investigate how these novelty signals affected the neural and behavioural
computation of value. In principle, novelty can be incorporated into RL models in two ways: (1) nov-
elty directly augments the value function, thus increasing the predicted value and distorting future
value and prediction error computations, or (2) novelty promotes exploration (in a choice setting)
but does not distort value and prediction error computation (Kakade and Dayan, 2002). If novelty
increased value estimates early in the learning session (i.e. an optimistic value initialisation), then
positive prediction errors at the reward time should be very small in early trials and should slowly
grow over trials, as optimism faded. Similarly, negative prediction errors would appear as strong
suppressions which would be mitigated later. However, our results showed the opposite. We
observed a clear development of reward prediction errors depending on the learned value of cues
(Figure 3). On the other hand, when dopamine novelty responses were large, i.e. during early trials
of choice blocks, monkeys had a strong behavioural tendency to explore the unknown option (Fig-
ure 5). Thus, it appears that novelty increased dopamine responses to cues and was correlated with
high levels of exploration, consistent with previous studies (Costa et al., 2014), but the neural
responses did not reflect optimistic value initiation. Given the substantial projections of dopamine
neurons to cortical and subcortical structures involved in decision making (Lynd-Balta and Haber,
1994; Williams, 1998), dopamine responses to novel situations might set downstream neuronal
dynamics to an activity regime that is optimal for learning (Puig and Miller, 2012).
Previous learning studies have shown that dopamine neurons are activated by unpredictable
rewards, but not by completely predicted rewards (Mirenowicz and Schultz, 1994). Accordingly,
dopamine neurons respond most strongly to rewards delivered near the start of learning, when
rewards are most unpredictable and induce positive prediction errors (Hollerman and Schultz,
1998). Reward responses steadily decrease as the rewards become progressively more predictable
(Hollerman and Schultz, 1998). However, in that study a small fraction of neurons (12%) responded
to fully predicted rewards. Similarly, in studies using rodent models some dopamine responses to
fully predicted rewards have remained (Pan et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2012; Hamid et al., 2016).
Several possible mechanisms can explain dopamine responses to ‘completely predicted’ rewards.
With regard to the two cited learning studies in primates, the former task (in which dopamine neu-
rons did not respond to fully-predicted rewards) was a simple instrumental task (Mirenowicz and
Schultz, 1994), whereas in the latter task the monkeys had to make a choice before performing the
instrumental response (Hollerman and Schultz, 1998). It is therefore possible that the more
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complex task context led to less subjective certainty about upcoming reward. In our study cues pre-
dicted the reward only probabilistically, not allowing us to study dopamine responses to fully pre-
dicted rewards. Nevertheless, both excitation and suppression of dopamine responses to rewards
developed over trials, in a manner consistent with prediction error signalling.
Dopamine neurons respond to prediction errors elicited by conditioned stimuli, which predict the
future delivery of reward (Schultz et al., 1997). The dopamine response to the simultaneous onset
of choice options is a special case of this responding, because future reward delivery is contingent
upon the choice as well as the values that are currently on offer. Previous studies of dopamine activ-
ity during choice have shown chosen value coding by dopamine signals (Morris et al., 2006;
Saddoris et al., 2015), but other studies have shown coding of the best available option, irrespec-
tive of choice (Roesch et al., 2007). Our results confirm the chosen value character of this response
and indicate that choice-dependent dopamine signals arose very early with respect to both the
onset of learning block as well as the onset of choice within each trial (Figure 7). However, distinct
from previous reports, our results indicate that the dopamine signal takes the value of both chosen
and unchosen options into account, thus reflecting relative chosen value. The relative value coding
nature implies that choosing the exact same option is associated with very different responses in
dopamine neurons depending on the value of the alternative option. From this standpoint, our
results are fundamentally compatible with a recent report (Kishida et al., 2016) indicating that stria-
tal dopamine concentration in human subjects reflects standard reward prediction error as well as
counterfactual prediction error (the difference between the actual outcome and outcome of the
action not taken). Our findings provide a cellular correlate for this phenomenon and indicate that
flexible encoding of both choice options already occurs at the level of dopamine action potentials.
Dopamine prediction error responses are well-known teaching signals. These signals are transmit-
ted to the striatum and cortex where they would be capable to update stimulus and action values
(Reynolds et al., 2001; Shen et al., 2008). Dopamine signals induce value learning
(Steinberg et al., 2013) and are implicated in multiple aspects of goal-directed behaviour
(Schultz, 1998; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Stauffer et al., 2016). The results demonstrated in
this study advance our knowledge of dopamine function by suggesting that dopamine signals might
play a critical role in computing flexible values needed for economic decision making (Padoa-
Schioppa, 2011). The fast and flexible dopamine responses we observed during choice correspond
well to recent findings demonstrating the encoding of economic utility by dopamine neurons
(Lak et al., 2014; Stauffer et al., 2014) and the necessity of phasic dopamine responses for consis-
tent choices (Zweifel et al., 2009). Taken together, these data point to a possible function for dopa-
mine neurons in influencing decisions, in form of updating neuronal decision mechanisms in a rapid
and flexible manner.
Materials and methods
Animals, surgery and setup
Two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were used for all experiments (13.4 and 13.1 kg). All
experimental protocols and procedures were approved by the Home Office of the United Kingdom.
A titanium head holder (Gray Matter Research) and stainless steel recording chamber (Crist Instru-
ments and custom made) were aseptically implanted under general anaesthesia before the experi-
ment. The recording chamber for vertical electrode entry was centered 8 mm anterior to the
interaural line. During experiments, animals sat in a primate chair (Crist Instruments) positioned 30
cm from a computer monitor. During behavioural training, testing and neuronal recording, eye posi-
tion was monitored noninvasively using infrared eye tracking (ETL200; ISCAN). Licking was moni-
tored with an infrared optical sensor positioned in front of the juice spout (V6AP; STM Sensors). Eye,
lick and digital task event signals were sampled at 2 kHz. The behavioural tasks were controlled
using Matlab (Mathworks Inc.) running on a Microsoft Windows XP computer.
Behavioural tasks
Pavlovian learning task
In each block of the experiment, the three examined probabilities (0.25, 0.50 and 0.75) of getting
the 0.4 ml juice (and 0.1 ml juice otherwise) were randomly assigned to three novel cues (i.e. fractal
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images). In each trial, one of the three cues was randomly chosen and was presented to the animal.
The reward was delivered 2 s after the cue onset. An experimental block was typically lasted 90–120
trials, constituting 30–40 trials for each cue. Trials were separated with inter-trial intervals of 2–5 s.
The learning set in this experiment included 210 novel cues, presented in 70 blocks.
Choice learning task
The monkeys were offered a choice between a familiar cue, whose probability was known through
extensive previous training (>5000 Pavlovian trials), and a novel cue, whose probability had to be
learned. The familiar cue predicted 50% chance of getting 0.4 ml and 50% chance of receiving 0.1
ml. The novel cues were associated with probabilities of 0.25, 0.50 or 0.75 of receiving the large (0.4
ml) reward and 0.1 ml otherwise. In each choice trial, after successful central fixation for 0.5 s, choice
options appeared on the monitor and the animal indicated its choice by a saccade towards one of
the cues. The animal was allowed to saccade as soon as it wanted. The animal had to keep its gaze
on the chosen cue for 0.5 s to confirm its choice. Reward was delivered 1.5 s after the choice confir-
mation. Trials were separated with inter-trial interval of 2–5 s. Failure to maintain the central fixation
or early break of the fixation on the chosen option resulted in 6 s time-out. At the end of each block
(typically 50 trials), the novel cue was replaced with another novel cue. The probabilities assigned to
novel cues were randomly chosen from the three possible probabilities. The learning set in this
experiment included 120 novel cues each presented against the familiar cue in a learning block.
Reinforcement learning models
Reinforcement learning models in the pavlovian task
We constructed standard reinforcement learning (RL) models and fitted each model onto trial-by-
trial dopamine responses in order to understand which model variant could best account for devel-
opment of dopamine responses during learning.
On each trial, t, after experiencing a cue xt and receiving an outcome, rt (0.1 or 0.4 ml), the model
computes a prediction error, dt, by comparing the rt and the value of the stimulus,VtðxtÞ, according
to:
dt ¼ rt  VtðxtÞ (1)
The model uses the dt to update the value of the stimulus, as following:
Vtþ1ðxtÞ ¼ VtðxtÞþadt (2)
where a is the learning rate. We considered three distinct forms of learning rate: (1) a fixed learning
rate (i.e. constant over trials); (2) a learning rate that decayed over trials, at ¼ 1=t
k, where k is a decay
constant; (3) and a learning rate that was adaptively adjusted according to:
atþ1ðxtÞ ¼ h dtj jþ ð1 hÞatðxtÞ (3)
where h is free parameter (a constant) which defines the degree to which the learning rate used in
the current trial, at should be modified based on the experienced prediction error, dt (Pearce and
Hall, 1980; Pearce et al., 1981; Le Pelley, 2004). In this model variant, we allowed a1 (learning rate
on the first trial) as a free parameter.
In order to account for the gradual decrease in dopamine responses to cues, we considered two
model variants, i.e. with or without a novelty term. In principle, novelty can be incorporated into RL
models in two ways: (1) novelty directly augments the value function, thus increases the predicted
value and distorts future value and prediction error computations, or (2) novelty promotes explora-
tion (in a choice setting) but does not distort value and prediction error computation (Kakade and
Dayan, 2002). If novelty increased value estimates early in the learning session (i.e. an optimistic
value initialisation), then positive prediction errors at the reward time should be very small in early
trials and slowly grows over trials, as optimism faded. Similarly, negative prediction errors would
appear as strong suppressions which will be mitigated later. However, our results showed the oppo-
site. We observed a clear development of reward prediction errors depending on the learned value
of cues (Figure 3). Accordingly, we incorporated the decaying novelty term into RL models in a way
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that it does not distort value and prediction error computation. The novelty term decayed over trials
according to:
Noveltyt ¼ e
ð t=tÞ=tð Þ (4)
where t is the decay time constant (Kakade and Dayan, 2002). We considered that in model var-
iants that included novelty term, in each trial the dopamine response to cue xt (measured 0.1–0.6 s
after the cue onset and thus including both novelty and value signals) reflects the sum of this novelty
term (Equation 4) and VtðxtÞ. However, in model variants without the novelty term, dopamine
response to cue only reflects VtðxtÞ Note that in models with the novelty term, prediction errors com-
putation and value updating follow Equations 1 and 2 and thus novelty term does not influence
these computations. We initialised the value of all cues in a session as 0.25 ml, i.e. average value of
all reward predicting cues (allowing the model to freely initialise values resulted in comparable
results). In order to compare the temporal dynamics underlying novelty and values responses, we
rearranged the model with fixed learning rate that included novelty term so that both its novelty and
value components follow error-driven learning (fixed learning rates: 1  eð 1=t
2
early
Þ and 1  eð 1=t
2
late
Þ,
V0 ¼ 1 and 0.25 and rt ¼ 0 and actual delivered rewards, respectively). We fit this model to trial-by-
trial neuronal responses (see below) and compared the recovered learning rates, reasoning that they
should be the same if both response components follow similar temporal dynamics.
In order to fit the models directly onto dopamine responses, we used the trial-by-trial rewards
actually delivered to the animal during each session as the input to each model, and then optimized
the free parameters of each model (Supplementary file 1) to minimize the difference between
dopamine responses to cues (measured 0.1–0.6 s after the cue onset, thus including both novelty
and value component) and model’s estimates of novelty + value (or only value estimates in models
without the novelty term). We estimated these parameters for each learning session using a maxi-
mum likelihood procedure. To do so, we used an unconstrained Nelder–Mead search algorithm
(MATLAB: fminsearch). To compare the fitting of different models on dopamine responses, we used
Bayesian Information criterion (BIC); lower BIC values indicates a better fit of model on the data. Fol-
lowing this fitting, we regressed early neuronal responses measured 0.1–0.2 s after cue onset (i.e.
dopamine novelty responses) onto novelty estimates from the superior model (Figure 4—figure sup-
plement 1B). We regressed neuronal responses measured 0.2–0.6 s after the cue onset onto value
estimates of the superior model. In order to have models estimates and dopamine activity on the
same scale (for illustrations in Figure 4B and Figure 4—figure supplement 1A and regression analy-
ses), we added the average normalized firing rate of neuron recorded in a session (i.e. a constant) to
the model’s value estimates of that session.
Reinforcement learning models in the choice task
We constructed standard reinforcement learning (RL) models to examine animals’ choices during
learning and to acquire trial-by-trial estimate of chosen and unchosen values (Figure 8—figure sup-
plement 1). Similar to models fitted on neuronal responses in the Pavlovian task, we constructed six
variations of RL model differing in their learning rates (fixed, decaying over trial or adaptive) and
inclusion of a novelty term.
The models comprised two value functions ðVtðf Þ and VtðnÞÞ representing the learned values of
the familiar and novel cues on trial t, respectively. In each trial, the probability that the model choo-
ses the novel cue over the familiar cue was estimated by the softmax rule (Sutton and Barto, 1998)
as follows:
pt ¼
eVtðnÞ=b
eVtðnÞ=bþ eVtðf Þ=b
(5)
where b, the temperature parameter of the softmax rule, determines the level of choice randomness.
Note that in models that included a novelty term, the softmax operation was performed over Vtðf Þ
and VtðnÞþNoveltyt, where Noveltyt are computed according to Equation 4. This arrangement pro-
motes choices of novel cues in initial trials of learning without influencing value and prediction error
computations.
In each trial, upon making a choice and receiving an outcome, the value of the chosen option on
that trial, VtðchosentÞ, was updated according the reward prediction error, as follows:
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Vtþ1ðchosentÞ ¼ VtðchosentÞþa½rt  VtðchosentÞ (6)
where rt indicates the size of reward received in trial t (0.1 and 0.4 ml), a denotes the learning rate
(fixed, decaying or adaptive in different model variants) and the prediction error,
dt ¼ ½rt  VtðchosentÞ, indicates the difference between the expected and realized reward sizes. Given
that in our experiments we had familiar (over-trained) and novel cues, it is conceivable that animals
updated the value of these two cues with different rates. Thus, we allowed each of the model var-
iants to have two different learning rates (one for each cue) in each learning block (see
Supplementary file 2).
We estimated the free parameters of each model variants (Supplementary file 2) for each learn-
ing session using a maximum likelihood procedure. To do this, we used an unconstrained Nelder–
Mead search algorithm (MATLAB: fminsearch). To compare the fitting of different models on behav-
ioural choices, we used Bayesian Information criterion (BIC). Similar to models used for Pavlovian
data, in model variants that included an adaptive learning rate (Equation 3), we allowed a1 (learning
rate on the first trial) as a free parameter. We initialised the value of familiar and novel cues in a ses-
sion as 0.25 ml (allowing the model to freely initialise values resulted in comparable results). Follow-
ing this fitting, we regressed neuronal responses measured 0.4–0.65 s after the cue (i.e. dopamine
value responses) onto chosen, unchosen and relative chosen value estimated from the superior
model (Figure 8). We also regressed neuronal responses measured 0.1–0.2 s after cue onset (i.e.
dopamine novelty responses) onto novelty estimates of the superior model (Figure 8—figure sup-
plement 2B).
Neuronal data acquisition and analysis of neuronal data
Custom-made, movable, glass-insulated, platinum-plated tungsten microelectrodes were positioned
inside a stainless steel guide cannula and advanced by an oil-driven micromanipulator (Narishige).
Action potentials from single neurons were amplified, filtered (band-pass 100 Hz to 3 kHz), and con-
verted into digital pulses when passing an adjustable time–amplitude threshold (Bak Electronics).
We stored both analog and digitized data on a computer using Matlab (Mathworks Inc.).
Dopamine neurons were functionally localized with respect to (a) the trigeminal somatosensory
thalamus explored in awake animals and under general anaesthesia (very small perioral and intraoral
receptive fields, high proportion of tonic responses, 2–3 mm dorsoventral extent), (b) tonically posi-
tion coding ocular motor neurons and (c) phasically direction coding ocular premotor neurons in
awake animals. Individual dopamine neurons were identified using established criteria of long wave-
form (>2.5 ms) and low baseline firing (<8 impulses/s) (Schultz and Romo, 1987). Following the
standard sample size used in studies investigating neuronal responses in non-human primates, we
recorded extracellular activity from 169 dopamine neurons in two monkeys (Pavlovian task: 38 and
32 neurons in monkey A and B; Choice task: 57 and 42 neurons in monkey A and B, respectively).
Most neurons that met these criteria showed the typical phasic activation after unexpected reward,
which we used as a fourth criterion for inclusion in data analysis.
We constructed Peri-stimulus time histograms (PSTHs) by aligning the neuronal impulses to task
events and then averaging across multiple trials. The impulse rates were calculated in non-overlap-
ping time bins of 10 ms. PSTHs were smoothed using a moving average of 70 ms for display pur-
poses. The analysis of neuronal data used defined time windows that included the major positive
and negative response components following cue onset and juice delivery, as detailed for each anal-
ysis and each figure caption.
To quantify the development of probability-dependent dopamine responses over trials, we
employed one-way ANOVA, which we serially applied to trial-by-trial population responses, i.e., to
responses of all neurons in trial 1, trial 2, etc. Likewise, for quantification of the time course that
dopamine responses differentiate in relation to animal’s choice, we used a Mann-Whitney U test on
the neuronal population responses (10 ms non-overlapping window of analysis starting 200 ms
before the choice). In order to quantify the differences among responses to cues for each cell
recorded in the Pavlovian task, we used a one-way ANOVA on neuronal responses from sixth to last
trial of each session. In order to quantify the changes of dopamine novelty responses over trials we
fitted a power function (tn, where t represents trial number) on normalized neuronal responses of
each cell. For this fitting, responses of each neuron were normalized to its response on the first trials
Lak et al. eLife 2016;5:e18044. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.18044 16 of 19
Research article Neuroscience
of the learning block. This fit results in negative or positive values of n for neurons that exhibit a
decreasing or increasing cue-evoked response over trials, respectively. We used 95% confidence
interval of the fit to acquire statistical significance. In order to test whether dopamine novelty
responses (in the Pavlovian task) better reflect cue repetition or progress through the block (i.e. trial
number), we regressed neuronal responses on number of times the cues were seen and also on the
trial number in the block (for this analysis we only focused on first 10 trials of the block to better dis-
sociate these two variables). To examine the contribution of early and late components of dopamine
cue responses to prediction error computation at reward time, we employed a multiple linear
regression analysis. In order to relate neuronal response in the Pavlovian task to RL model estimates,
we used single linear regressions (see Reinforcement learning models section). To relate neuronal
response in the choice task to RL model fits on the behavioural choice data, we used single linear
regression analysis both on neuronal population response as well as on responses of each dopamine
neuron (see Reinforcement learning models section).
Normalization of neuronal responses
In order to quantify novelty response decay of each cell throughout learning using the fitting
described above (Figure 2B), responses of each neuron was normalized to its response on the first
trials of the learning block. In all other analyses, we divided spike count of each neuron in the analy-
sis window to the spike count of the same neuron in the control window that immediately preceded
each respective task event and had identical duration. Thus, a neuronal response that was not modu-
lated by a task event had a normalized activity equal to one for that task event.
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